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Abstract 
Research on the psychology of conspiracy theories has shown recent steps toward a 
standardization of measures. The present article seeks to continue that trend by presenting the 
Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions (FICS), a questionnaire template that can be 
adapted to measure suspicions of a conspiracy around nearly any topic of public interest. 
Compared to conspiracy belief measures that ask about specific theories on a given topic, the 
FICS is worded in such a way as to provide relatively stable validity across time and cultural 
context. Using a hybrid approach incorporating classical test theory and Rasch scaling, three 
questionnaire studies on Mechanical Turk demonstrate the validity of the FICS in measuring 
conspiracy suspicions regarding 9/11, vaccine safety, and U.S. elections, with good 
psychometric properties in most situations. However, the utility of the FICS is limited in the 
case of climate change due to the existence of two opposing conspiracy theories that share 
essentially no common assumptions (“climate change is a hoax” versus “there is a conspiracy 
to make people believe that climate change is a hoax”). The results indicate that the FICS is a 
reliable and valid measure of conspiracy suspicions within certain parameters, and suggest a 
three-level model that differentiates general conspiracist ideation, relatively vague conspiracy 
suspicions, and relatively specific conspiracy beliefs. 
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In the past ten years, conspiracy theories have become the subject of a good deal of 
psychological research. Conspiracy theories, whether true or false, can be productively 
defined as proposed plots by multiple powerful agents to act covertly in the pursuit of a 
sinister goal (Wood, Douglas, & Sutton, 2012). Psychologists have investigated the 
antecedents (e.g. Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999), consequences (e,g, 
Jolley & Douglas, 2014a), and structure (e.g. Wood et al., 2012) of beliefs that malevolent 
conspiracies lie behind certain world events. The gradual accumulation of evidence has led to 
some debate surrounding measurement: how can we best measure beliefs in conspiracy 
theories? Some recent innovations in the field aside (e.g. Raab, Ortlieb, Auer, Guthmann, & 
Carbon, 2013), the most common approach to measuring conspiracy mentality or conspiracist 
ideation – an overall tendency to believe or disbelieve conspiracy theories (e.g. Abalakina-
Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Sutton, 2011; Swami et al., 2011) – uses questionnaires that ask 
participants to rate their agreement with a list of statements. These statements are either 
specific conspiracy theories, such as “The U.N. is trying to take control of the United States” 
(Abalakina-Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999, p. 641), or statements of more generally 
conspiracy-minded worldviews, such as “I think there are secret organizations that greatly 
influence political decisions” (Bruder, Haffke, Neave, Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013). The 
more general style of questionnaire, exemplified by the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale 
(GCB; Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013) and the Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire 
(CMQ; Bruder et al., 2013), has certain advantages over questionnaires which ask about 
specific theories. Primarily, generic scales like the GCB and CMQ are less bound by cultural 
and temporal context than specifically-worded questionnaires are. For example, the Beliefs in 
Conspiracy Theories Inventory (BCTI; Swami, Chamorro-Premuzic, & Furnham, 2010) asks 
about topics like Area 51 and the Oklahoma City bombing, knowledge of which is likely to 
vary considerably over time and across different cultures. 
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It is important to explore the prevalence, structure, and style of beliefs in conspiracy 
theories, as there is reason to believe that conspiracy belief is a meaningfully distinct 
construct from seemingly related concepts such as paranormal belief, delusional thinking, 
schizotypy, and tolerance for ambiguity. It is true that paranormal beliefs correlate with 
beliefs in conspiracy theories and may share some similar cognitive roots, such as trait 
schizotypy (Darwin, Neave, & Holmes, 2011; Drinkwater, Dagnall, & Parker, 2012; 
Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & Mischo, 1999). However, the effect sizes tend to be 
quite discrepant – paranormal beliefs show zero-order correlations of about .60 with 
schizotypy (Genovese, 2005; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2008), while regression models 
incorporating the various subcomponents of schizotypy together explain less than 15% of the 
variance in conspiracy beliefs (Barron, Morgan, Towell, Altemeyer, & Swami, 2014). The 
magnitude of the correlation between conspiracy beliefs and delusional ideation is unclear, 
but the effect does not appear to be large; studies show it ranging from .27 (Dagnall et al., 
2015) to .48 (Brotheron et al., 2013). 
Ambiguity is an important concept in the formation of both paranormal beliefs and 
conspiracy beliefs. Conspiracy theories thrive by leaving the exact details of perpetrators, 
motives, and methods relatively ambiguous (Clarke, 2007; Dean, 2002), and paranormal 
belief is a method of resolving ambiguity (Rense & Houran, 1998). A high tolerance for 
ambiguity is associated with more paranormal experiences, and therefore more belief. On the 
other hand, a low tolerance for ambiguity leads to a greater fear of the paranormal and fearful 
attribution of ambiguous stimuli to paranormal causes, also resulting in higher paranormal 
belief. While the relationship may be curvilinear, the overall correlation between ambiguity 
tolerance and general paranormal belief tends to be negative (Houran & Williams, 1998; 
Rense & Houran, 1998, 1999). Likewise, magical thinking is more pronounced among those 
with low ambiguity tolerance (Keinan, 1994). However, there is no current evidence 
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suggesting that the relationship between conspiracy theory belief and tolerance of ambiguity 
follows this pattern; Abalakina-Paap et al. (1999) found no correlation between beliefs in 
conspiracy theories and ambiguity tolerance, and the need for cognitive closure, a related 
variable, also has no consistent relationship with conspiracy belief (Leman & Cinnirella, 
2013). While neither of these investigations looked for a curvilinear relationship or built 
complex process models in the same manner as the literature on paranormal belief, the lack of 
a zero-order correlation in both cases suggests that tolerance of ambiguity and allied 
constructs may have differing influences on paranormal and conspiracy beliefs. Paranormal 
beliefs can begin as sense-making attributions that help to reduce the fear generated by 
ambiguous experiences (Houran & Williams, 1998), but conspiracy beliefs seem to exist in a 
state of ongoing ambiguity in which many different possible explanations are simultaneously 
held and considered (Wood et al., 2012; Wood & Douglas, 2013, 2015). Moreover, while 
paranormal beliefs are thought to arise initially in the absence of a conventional explanation 
(Lange & Houran, 1998), conspiracy theories usually explicitly oppose existing conventional 
explanations, positing that they are deliberate lies (Wood et al., 2012). Finally, conspiracy 
theories are laden with ideological, interpersonal, and intergroup dynamics in a way that 
paranormal beliefs generally are not (e.g. Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Uscinski & Parent, 2014). 
Research on conspiracy mentality, then, seems to suggest that it is a meaningfully distinct 
construct from other forms of unusual belief. 
Of course, researchers are not only interested in general conspiracy mentality. Just as 
specific paranormal beliefs (psychic abilities, poltergeists, etc.) are often the target of 
investigations, conspiracy theories about specific topics are sometimes of particular interest. 
For instance, recent studies have looked specifically at climate change (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a), the death of Princess Diana (Douglas & Sutton, 2008), the 9/11 attacks (Swami et al., 
2010), or HIV/AIDS (Bogart & Thorburn, 2005). Douglas and Sutton (2008) measured 
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beliefs in conspiracy theories about the death of Princess Diana using items like “Diana faked 
her own death so she and Dodi could retreat into isolation” or “Diana had to die to prevent an 
Arab Muslim from marrying into the British royal family.” Likewise, the 9/11 conspiracy 
scale used by Swami et al. (2010) asked about a variety of different 9/11 conspiracy theories, 
including the idea that the Twin Towers were destroyed by controlled demolition charges and 
that the Pentagon was hit by a missile rather than a passenger aircraft. In general, then, 
conspiracy beliefs about a particular subject (like 9/11, Diana, HIV, etc.) are measured by 
asking about a variety of specific theories on that subject. 
Yet this method of measuring conspiracy beliefs about particular topics is 
problematic. It suffers from the same issues that plague specifically-worded scales of general 
conspiracy thinking. As Brotherton et al. (2013) and Bruder et al. (2013) have argued, the 
content of conspiracy theories can shift dramatically across time and cultural contexts: an 
American conspiracy theorist from 1975 might have very different beliefs compared to an 
Egyptian conspiracy theorist from 2015. This is trivially true for conspiracy thinking in 
general, but it is also true for theories about specific topics. Just as specifically-worded 
measures of general conspiracy thinking may see dramatic changes in validity over time and 
space, I argue that the same is true of specifically-worded measures of conspiracy theories 
about particular topics.  
Consider a hypothetical measure of 9/11 conspiracy theories developed in 2005. The 
researchers constructing this scale would most likely include the conspiracy theories that 
were being widely discussed at the time, including specific statements concerning how the 
attacks were carried out and covered up. Two likely items would be the idea that the aircraft 
that hit the Twin Towers had concealed missiles on board (prominently featured in the 
Internet documentary Loose Change; Rowe, Bermas, Brown, & Avery, 2005) and the theory 
that most or all of the Jewish people working in the Twin Towers were warned to stay home 
6 
on the day of the attacks (U.S. Department of State, 2005). However, the claim that missiles 
hit the Twin Towers has all but disappeared from the arguments made by the 9/11 Truth 
Movement in recent years; it was even removed from subsequent editions of Loose Change. 
The “no Jews died on 9/11” theory has also more or less vanished from Western conspiracy 
discourse about 9/11. Outside of the West, however, it still enjoys some currency, along with 
various other theories that implicate Jews and Israel in the attacks (WorldPublicOpinion.org, 
2008). Conversely, specific claims that have become more popular in recent years, such as 
the idea that thermite was used to carry out a controlled demolition of the Twin Towers 
(Watson & Jones, 2005), might not have gained enough popularity at the time to come to the 
researchers’ attention. Given the above, it is quite probable that our hypothetical 9/11 
conspiracy scale would see a substantial decline in validity and internal consistency in the 
years after its initial publication. 
One possible way to avoid this issue stems from the finding that beliefs in conspiracy 
theories are often fairly vague. Endorsement of specific conspiracy theories is driven by 
uncertainty, suspicions about ulterior motives and coverups, and a general reluctance to 
accept received or official explanations (Wood et al., 2012; Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2013). 
While some people advocate conspiracy theories by arguing for specific theories, the 
majority adopt a strategy of sowing doubt and raising suspicion about official or mainstream 
accounts, with the implication that some sort of conspiracy, however vague, is afoot. This 
pattern is thought to indicate that the beliefs themselves are justified more on the grounds of 
disbelief than of positive belief (Wood & Douglas, 2013, 2015). Based on this insight, I argue 
that a better way to measure conspiracy beliefs about a particular topic is to ask about general 
conspiracy suspicions rather than specific conspiracy theories. While specific theories might 
vary in terms of their popularity, a general suspicion of conspiracy retains a relatively 
consistent meaning. For example, a group of anti-vaccination activists might have quite 
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different specific beliefs about vaccine safety. Perhaps one person thinks they cause autism, 
one thinks they are tainted with HIV, one thinks they contain tracking microchips, one thinks 
they are a plot to sterilize the population, and so on (Jolley & Douglas, 2014b). While these 
people believe various different conspiracy theories about vaccines, they share a common 
suspicion. They all believe that the real truth is explosive and shocking, and that a campaign 
of disinformation has successfully tricked many people into believing a carefully constructed 
lie instead. The belief that this is true of some topic is conspiracy suspicion; the belief in a 
particular lie, a particular coverup, and a particular hidden truth is a conspiracy theory.  
There is good reason to believe that specific conspiracy theories may be 
manifestations of an underlying suspicion. In the wider social psychological literature, 
suspicion is generally prompted by information about an actor having a potential ulterior 
motive for engaging in some behaviour (Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). Once suspicious, 
people are less susceptible to the fundamental attribution error, engage in more effortful 
thinking about the reasons for others’ behaviour, and remain in a state of suspended 
judgement about others’ motives until more information is acquired (Fein, 1996; Kramer, 
1998; Sinaceur, 2009). Suspicion, then, is a state of ambiguity that prompts sophisticated 
attributional thinking. This is reflected in how people think about conspiracy theories under 
conditions of uncertainty. Uncertainty about whether an event was the result of a sinister 
conspiracy prompts increased attention to the morality of authorities in order to make a 
judgement about whether a conspiracy theory is plausible or not (Van Prooijen & Jostmann, 
2013). Moreover, suspicious perceivers will spontaneously generate counterarguments 
against new information, even when the information is unrelated to the original source of 
suspicion (Schul, Mayo, & Burnstein, 2004). Immediate counterargumentation against 
specific information or definite hypotheses has been highlighted as a potential explanation for 
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the essential vagueness of many conspiracy beliefs (Clarke, 2007; Dean, 2002; Wood et al., 
2012). 
On this basis, it may be useful to create a template for measuring relatively vague 
suspicions that there is some sort of conspiracy behind a particular topic. Measuring 
suspicions, rather than beliefs in particular theories, would address the problems with 
specifically-worded scales outlined above. While specifically-worded scales may show 
substantial variation in effectiveness depending on the time and cultural context, a scale of 
conspiracy suspicions would measure the general perceptions of conspiracy that are constant 
across whatever specific theories a person might believe. Moreover, while constructing a 
specifically-worded scale requires the researcher to have relatively deep knowledge of the 
various conspiracy theories surrounding a subject, a suspicion scale would ideally require 
very little knowledge beyond the simple existence of conspiracy theories about a topic. The 
challenge in creating such a scale would be to ensure that it corresponds closely enough to 
measures of specific conspiracy theories about the same subject - in other words, that general 
suspicions are sufficiently closely linked with specific theories that one can be measured in 
place of the other. 
The remainder of this article will present an initial attempt at constructing a scale of 
conspiracy suspicion: the Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions, or FICS. The FICS 
takes a “fill-in-the-blank” approach; each item contains a blank space that can be filled in 
with the topic of interest. The scale is therefore versatile enough that it could be adapted to 
measure suspicions of a conspiracy behind any particular event, topic, social group, or piece 
of knowledge. Study 1 generated a 17-item scale from an initial pool of 50 candidate items 
and examined the scale’s convergent validity with an existing measure of beliefs in 9/11 
conspiracy theories. Study 2 examined both convergent and discriminant validity in relation 
to scales of 9/11 and vaccine conspiracy theory beliefs. Finally, Study 3 demonstrated 
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criterion validity by demonstrating a lack of negative association between beliefs in election 
conspiracy theories and democratic participation, and established the limits of the scale in a 
situation where a particular topic (climate change) elicited ideologically incompatible 
conspiracy theories. Using data from Studies 2 and 3, the article concludes with a Rasch 
scaling analysis that purifies the 17-item FICS to a 5-item short-form version with optimal 
validity and internal consistency. 
STUDY 1 
Scale format 
The FICS consists of a series of statements followed by Likert scale responses 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Each statement alleges that 
something is being kept from the public regarding a specific topic. For instance, one item 
reads, “There is something very suspicious about the things the public has been told about 
______.” The items are phrased generically enough that the blank spaces could be filled in 
with any topic or event ranging from “the moon landings” to “ISIS” to “Satanic ritual abuse.” 
The scale is designed in such a way that every blank space in a single version of the scale 
ought to contain the same text, so that each item asks about the same thing. The scale was 
preceded by a short instructional text reading “Please rate your agreement with the following 
statements.” 
Item generation 
An initial pool of 50 items was generated by the author. Half of them were coded 
straightforwardly, such that agreement indicated a high level of conspiracy suspicion; the 
other 25 were reverse-coded. 
Participants 
A total of 500 participants (288 men, 212 women) were recruited for Study 1 via 
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk), under the general rule of thumb that an exploratory 
10 
factor analysis ought to have at least ten participants per item (Nunnally, 1978; though see 
MacCallum, Widaman, Preacher, & Hong, 2001, for a contrasting view). Participants ranged 
from 18 to 69 years of age, with a mean age of 35.07 years (SD = 10.97). All participants 
were U.S. residents and had an MTurk accuracy rating of at least 90%. Each participant was 
paid $1.50 for taking part in the study. 
Materials 
The initial item pool of the FICS was used, with each blank filled in with “9/11.” An 
example (reverse-coded) item was therefore “The truth about 9/11 is pretty well-established, 
and it’s only a controversial subject because of a few crackpots stirring up doubt.” 
In addition to the FICS, participants were asked to complete the 9/11 conspiracy 
theory belief scale used by Swami et al. (2010). This consisted of 15 statements followed by a 
Likert response scale ranging from 1 (completely false) to 9 (completely true). Each statement 
was a specific conspiracy theory regarding 9/11; for instance, “The Pentagon was not hit by a 
passenger aircraft but something smaller, possibly a missile.” This scale displayed very high 
internal consistency in the present study (Cronbach’s α = .98). 
Procedure 
The study was advertised via MTurk under the heading “Give your opinion on 
historical events (5-10 min).” After signing up via MTurk, participants were directed to an 
external survey website (Qualtrics), which presented them with an informed consent form. 
Those who agreed to continue provided their age, gender, and nationality, and then completed 
the FICS, followed by the Swami scale. Finally, they were shown a debriefing screen 
containing a code that they could enter on the MTurk site to complete the task. All 
participants were credited within 24 hours of completing the task.  
Results 
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An exploratory factor analysis on the FICS data was conducted using maximum 
likelihood extraction and oblimin rotation (delta = 0). An inspection of the resulting scree 
plot confirmed a two-factor solution, with all items loading at least moderately strongly on 
the first factor, and all reverse-coded items loading on the second rotated factor. This 
parallels the finding of Brotherton et al. (2013) that reverse-coded conspiracy belief items 
tend to load on a separate factor; as such, reverse-coded items were dropped and the analysis 
run again with the 25 remaining items. The same analysis of this reduced scale confirmed a 
single-factor solution. Eight of the remaining items displayed relatively weak factor loadings 
(6, 14, 24, 30, 42, 43, 46, and 50); as such, the final scale consisted of all items with loadings 
of .70 or above on this factor. This resulted in the following 17-item scale: 
1. The real truth about 9/11 is being kept from the public. 
2. There is something very suspicious about the things the public has been told about 
9/11. 
3. People need to wake up and start asking questions about 9/11. 
4. Those in power are going to a great deal of trouble to keep 9/11 from being 
thoroughly investigated. 
5. If most people knew the real truth about 9/11, there would be riots in the streets. 
6. It’s very suspicious that so few people in the media question whether we’re being 
told the truth about 9/11. 
7. When it comes to 9/11, most people are asleep and need to wake up. 
8. Those in power are very nervous that the public will realize the truth about 9/11. 
9. Legitimate questions about 9/11 are being suppressed by the government, the 
media, and academia.  
10. The facts about 9/11 simply don’t match what we’ve been told by “experts” and 
the mainstream media.  
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11. We need a new, unbiased investigation to uncover the real truth about 9/11. 
12. Anyone who's been paying attention knows that we're being lied to about 9/11, but 
most people are simply brainwashed.  
13. Reporters, scientists, and government officials are involved in a conspiracy to 
cover up important information about 9/11. 
14. We may never know the full truth about 9/11, but it's clear that the mainstream 
story is a complete lie.  
15. If the truth about 9/11 came out, it would hurt the interests of some extremely 
powerful people.  
16. The mainstream media could never have an honest discussion about 9/11 - there 
are too many powerful interests at work. 
17. An impartial, independent investigation of 9/11 would show once and for all that 
we've been lied to on a massive scale. 
 
The reduced 17-item scale showed very high reliability, Cronbach’s α = .98. The 
mean score was 2.50, somewhat below the midpoint of the scale (3.00), and there was some 
evidence of positive skew. Despite the generic tone of the scale items, the 17-item FICS 
displayed a very strong correlation with the Swami 9/11 scale, r = .88. 
Discussion 
As predicted, the results of Study 1 indicate a close fit between beliefs in 9/11 
conspiracy theories and what I have termed here “conspiracy suspicions” about 9/11: the two 
measures shared over three-quarters of their variance with one another. This establishes the 
initial validity of the FICS as a measure of conspiracy suspicions, and provides a good basis 
for further investigation of general suspicions as a consistent marker of beliefs in specific 
conspiracy theories. 
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One result noted above, the initial two-factor solution generated by the negatively 
worded items, echoes a similar finding by Brotherton et al. (2013). Here, as in that paper, the 
reverse-coded items loaded uniquely on a second factor and ultimately fell below the 
internal-consistency threshold used to eliminate underperforming items. While this is 
probably a purely psychometric issue rather than a reflection of two genuine underlying 
factors (cf. Greenberger, Chen, Dmitrieva, & Farruggia, 2003), it may be important in the 
future to take into account the observed asymmetry in pro- versus anti-conspiracy discourse: 
pro-conspiracy rhetoric generally takes the form of negative arguments that debunk 
mainstream or official accounts, while anti-conspiracy rhetoric tends to focus on positive 
arguments that support mainstream or official accounts (Wood & Douglas, 2013, 2015). 
Although the FICS, being a general scale, cannot ask about specific official or unofficial 
explanations, positive or negative wording of particular items might be relevant for future 
efforts in construction of more specific conspiracy belief scales. 
Although all 17 of the selected items performed well and the scale displayed high 
internal consistency, a shorter scale would be beneficial under certain circumstances (for 
instance, when there are several topics of interest). As such, a short-form version of the FICS 
is an eventual goal of this research project. However, simply selecting the items that 
performed best on 9/11 scales would be premature, and may overvalue a single case of what 
is meant to be a generally applicable scale. It is not clear to what extent the 17 selected items 
are generally good measures of conspiracy suspicion versus simply good items as pertains to 
9/11 in particular. As such, further studies were needed to broaden confidence in the validity 
of the FICS as an adaptable scale and to validate the construct of conspiracy suspicion in 
different contexts. 
STUDY 2 
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In Study 1, the 9/11 version of the FICS correlated very strongly with a previously 
validated measure of beliefs in 9/11 conspiracy theories. However, it is possible that the 
FICS, rather than measuring beliefs in conspiracy theories about a particular topic, instead 
measures general conspiracist ideation in the manner of the GCB (Brotherton et al., 2013) or 
CMQ (Bruder et al., 2013). It is also possible that the FICS is well-suited to measuring 
beliefs in 9/11 conspiracy theories, but not to anything else. To examine this possibility, the 
second study set out to accomplish three distinct aims. First, it aimed to replicate the result of 
Study 1, demonstrating a strong correlation between the Swami 9/11 scale and the reduced 
9/11 version of the FICS (hereafter called FICS-911). Second, it aimed to evaluate the 
validity of a vaccine safety version of the FICS (hereafter FICS-VS) by correlating it with the 
vaccine danger conspiracy theory scale used by Jolley and Douglas [19]. Finally, it aimed to 
demonstrate that the two FICS results would be no more strongly correlated with one another 
than the Swami 9/11 scale and the Jolley vaccine scale would. This would indicate some 
amount of discriminant validity. 
Discriminant validity is a complicated concept when measuring beliefs in different 
conspiracy theories, as conspiracy beliefs tend to be relatively strongly intercorrelated even 
when they concern totally unrelated topics (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012). However, if 
two separate versions of the FICS are no more strongly related to one another than two 
traditional measures of conspiracy beliefs about the same variables are, that would constitute 
reasonable evidence that the FICS accesses the distinct suspicions underlying each class of 
conspiracy theory. 
Method 
Participants 
200 participants (91 women, 109 men; ages 18-71, mean age = 32.68, SD = 9.74) 
were recruited via MTurk. Sample size was selected on the basis of a power analysis: for 
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80% power to detect an effect as small as r = .20, 193 participants would be required. All 
participants were U.S. residents, had an MTurk accuracy rating of at least 90%, and had not 
participated in Study 1. They were paid $1 each for participating. 
FICS variants 
Two variants of the 17-item version of the FICS were used in Study 2. The FICS-911 
used the same text as the measure in Study 1; the FICS-VS filled in the blanks with “vaccine 
safety.” An example item of the latter was therefore “An impartial, independent investigation 
of vaccine safety would show once and for all that we've been lied to on a massive scale.” 
Swami 9/11 scale 
 As in Study 1, Study 2 used the 9/11 conspiracy belief scale created by Swami et al. 
(2011). 
Jolley vaccine scale 
The scale of vaccine safety conspiracy theories from Study 1 of Jolley and Douglas 
(2014b) was adapted for the present study. Participants were asked to rate their agreement on 
a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) with 8 statements 
concerning various vaccine conspiracy theories. Example items included “The government is 
trying to cover up the link between vaccines and autism” and “Tiny devices are implanted in 
vaccines for use in mind control experiments.” There was one reverse-coded item. 
Procedure 
The study was advertised via MTurk under the heading “Survey of opinions on 
historical events (~5 min).” After signing up via MTurk, participants were directed to an 
external survey website (Qualtrics), which presented them with an informed consent form. 
Those who agreed to continue provided their age, gender, and nationality, and then completed 
the FICS-911, FICS-V, Swami 9/11 scale, and Jolley vaccine scale in counterbalanced order. 
Finally, they were shown a debriefing screen containing a code that they could enter on the 
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MTurk site to complete the task. All participants were credited within 24 hours of completing 
the task. 
Results and Discussion 
The scales all proved highly reliable: for the FICS-911, α = .99; for the Swami 9/11 
scale, α = .98; for the FICS-VS, α = .99; for the Jolley vaccine scale, α = .91. Factor analyses 
of both the FICS-911 and FICS-VS using maximum likelihood estimation confirmed one-
factor solutions, with no other eigenvalues exceeding 1. 
As expected, all scales were significantly intercorrelated (see Table 1); this is in 
agreement with previous research on the strong interrelationships between conspiracy beliefs. 
Crucially, the correlation between the FICS-VS and the Jolley vaccine scale was very strong, 
r = .88, as was the correlation between the FICS-911 and the Swami 9/11 scale, r = .90. 
These correlations are further evidence of the convergent validity of the FICS: both versions 
share about 80% of their variance with corresponding specifically-worded measures. 
Moreover, the vaccine correlation indicates that the FICS items are applicable beyond the 
domain of 9/11 conspiracy theories. 
While the FICS-911 and the FICS-VS were strongly correlated with one another (r = 
.58), this relationship was no stronger than the correlation between the Swami 9/11 scale and 
the Jolley vaccine scale (r = .64). Despite the rather minimal differences in phrasing between 
them, the two FICS versions are about as distinct from one another as the entirely unrelated 
Swami and Jolley scales are. This is good evidence of discriminant validity: the FICS is not a 
measure of general conspiracist ideation, or at least not more so than existing scales of 
individual conspiracy theory beliefs are. Rather, different versions of the FICS appear to tap 
into distinct clusters of conspiracy suspicions. 
STUDY 3 
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Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated that two different versions of the FICS produce 
valid and reliable results for conspiracy suspicions about two separate topics. Study 3 set out 
to examine the criterion validity of the FICS while applying it to conspiracy suspicions about 
two new topics: climate change and election fraud. 
Past research has demonstrated that exposure to pro-conspiracy-theory information 
results in lowered intentions to engage in civic behaviours such as voting or volunteering, and 
that reading an article alleging that climate change is a hoax lowers intentions to engage in 
environmental behaviours such as recycling or energy conservation (Jolley & Douglas, 
2014a). These changes in planned behaviour follow more or less naturally from the content of 
the beliefs. Voting and political participation are likely to be a waste of time if the world is 
run by conspiracies and democracy is an illusion. Likewise, if anthropogenic climate change 
is a hoax, there is little point in working to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
Interestingly, despite this experimental work, no study has yet demonstrated a simple 
zero-order correlation between beliefs in climate or election conspiracy theories and 
intentions to engage in the related behaviours. While exposure to conspiracy theories has 
been shown to induce belief in them (Douglas & Sutton, 2008; Swami et al., 2011), it is not 
yet clear whether people who generally believe that elections are fraudulent are any less 
likely to participate in them, or whether people who generally believe that climate change is a 
hoax are any less likely to conserve energy. There is good reason to believe that beliefs and 
behaviours should be linked in this case. Beyond the established effect of exposure to 
conspiracy theories on related behaviours, other studies have shown a strong association 
between anti-vaccine conspiracy beliefs and decreased vaccination intentions (Jolley & 
Douglas, 2014b). As such, Study 3 examined whether civic participation and pro-
environmental behavioural intentions could be predicted by either election and climate 
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versions of the FICS or specifically-worded measures of thematically related conspiracy 
beliefs. 
Method 
Participants 
200 participants (102 men, 98 women; ages 18-81, M = 35.65, SD = 10.52) were 
recruited via MTurk. Sample size was selected on the basis of a power analysis: for 80% 
power to detect an effect as small as r = .20, 193 participants would be required. All 
participants were U.S. residents, had an MTurk accuracy rating of at least 90%, and had not 
participated in Studies 1 or 2. They were paid $1.00 each for participating. 
FICS variants 
Two variants of the 17-item version of the FICS were used in Study 3.  The election 
fraud version of the FICS (hereafter FICS-E) filled in the blanks with “the integrity of our 
elections.” An example item was therefore “People need to wake up and start asking 
questions about the integrity of our elections.”  The climate change FICS variant (hereafter 
FICS-CC) filled in the blanks with “so-called ‘climate change.’” An example item was 
therefore “It’s very suspicious that so few people in the media question whether we’re being 
told the truth about so-called ‘climate change.’” This phrasing was chosen because if only 
“climate change” had been used, some of the FICS statements could be taken as a call to 
environmental action rather than as questioning the existence of the phenomenon  (e.g. 
“People need to wake up and start asking questions about climate change”). 
Climate conspiracy measures 
At the time of Study 3, there was no existing scale-length instrument to measure 
beliefs in climate change conspiracy theories. As such, Study 3 extracted three climate-
related items from the general conspiracy mentality scale used by Douglas and Sutton (2011; 
e.g. “The idea that the world is headed for catastrophic climate change is a fraud”) and the 
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single item used to evaluate climate change beliefs by Lewandowsky et al. (2013): “The 
claim that the climate is changing due to emissions from fossil fuels is a hoax perpetrated by 
corrupt scientists who wish to spend more taxpayer money on climate research.” Participants 
rated their agreement with these statements on a 1-5 point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 
5 = strongly agree). The Douglas and Sutton items showed good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha =.928) and all loaded on a single factor. 
Election conspiracy measure 
As with climate change, there was no existing scale length-instrument at the time 
Study 3 was conducted to measure beliefs in conspiracy theories regarding stolen elections. 
As such, Study 3 measured this using an original 5-item scale that asked about both 
fraudulent vote-counting (e.g. “Our elections are not decided by voters - they are decided by 
whoever counts the votes”) and large-scale voter fraud (e.g. “Election results in this country 
are heavily skewed by people voting more than once, impersonating others, and engaging in 
other forms of fraudulent voting”). It showed good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 
.935) and no indication of a multi-factor structure. 
Behavioural intentions 
Civic participation intentions were measured with a 7-item scale originally used by 
Jolley and Douglas (2014b). The items on this scale queried participants on their intentions to 
vote, volunteer, or engage in political campaigning or donating (e.g. “Do you intend to wear 
a campaign button, put a sticker on your car, or place a sign in front of your house in the 
next election?”). Intentions to engage in pro-environmental behaviours were also measured 
using a 7-item scale from Jolley and Douglas (2014b); these items asked about behaviours 
such as recycling, planting trees, curbing energy consumption, and encouraging others to do 
the same (e.g. “Do you intend in the next 12 months to explore purchasing energy from an 
alternative source (wind, solar, geothermal, biomass)?”). All behavioural intention 
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statements were rated on a 1-9 point Likert scale (1 = definitely no, 9 = definitely yes), and 
both showed good internal consistency (for pro-environmental behaviours, Cronbach’s alpha 
= 831; for civic engagement, Cronbach’s alpha = .848). 
Procedure 
The study was advertised via MTurk under the heading “Beliefs & behaviour study (~5 
min).” After signing up via MTurk, participants were directed to an external survey website 
(Qualtrics), which presented them with an informed consent form. Those who agreed to 
continue provided their age, gender, and nationality, and then completed the FICS-E, FICS-
CC, and behavioural intention scales in counterbalanced order, followed by the non-FICS 
conspiracy belief measures. Finally, they were shown a debriefing screen containing a code 
that they could enter on the MTurk site to complete the task. All participants were credited 
within 24 hours of completing the task. 
Results and Discussion 
The FICS-CC and FICS-E showed a strong positive correlation at r = .55 (p < .001), 
similar to the correlation between the FICS-VS and the FICS-911 in Study 2 (r = .61). 
However, neither FICS measure correlated with its associated behavioural intention measure. 
Conspiracy suspicions about elections, as measured by the FICS-E, did not correlate 
significantly with intended civic engagement (r = .02, ns); likewise, conspiracy suspicions 
about climate change did not correlate significantly with intentions to engage in 
environmental behaviours (r = .07, ns). 
In the former case, an analysis of the specific election conspiracy theories scale lends 
support to this counterintuitive finding. The specific election conspiracy items showed a 
strong positive correlation with the FICS-E, r = .78, and also did not significantly correlate 
with civic engagement, r = -.03. 
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In contrast, the lack of a significant correlation with environmental intentions appears 
to be due to a unique characteristic of the FICS-CC. The flexible measure correlated less 
strongly with the Douglas & Sutton (2011) climate change conspiracy items (r = .49) and 
with the Lewandowsky et al. (2013) item (ρ = .51). Unlike the FICS-CC, both the Douglas 
and Lewandowsky measures of climate change conspiracy theory belief showed statistically 
significant, though weak, negative correlations with pro-environmental behavioural intentions 
(r = -.27 and ρ = -.18, respectively). 
Although the FICS-E produced an unexpected result that was confirmed by a specific 
measure of election conspiracy theories, the FICS-CC failed to perform as well as specific 
measures of climate change conspiracy theories did. This is likely due to the existence of two 
opposing categories of conspiracy theories regarding climate change. While the Douglas & 
Sutton and Lewandowsky items specifically asked about the theory that climate change is a 
hoax, the FICS items were vague enough that they might also have elicited high responses 
from people who believe in a conspiracy to cover up the legitimacy and seriousness of 
climate change. A standard multiple regression analysis (due to the exploratory nature of the 
investigation) predicting intended pro-environmental behaviour from both the Douglas & 
Sutton measures and the FICS-CC supports this interpretation. Consistent with the correlation 
analysis above, score on the Douglas & Sutton climate items is a negative predictor of 
environmental behaviour, β = -.40, t(197) = -5.28, p < .001, sr2 = .123. The FICS-CC also 
reaches significance in this regression, but as a positive predictor of pro-environmental 
behaviours, β = .27, t(197) = 3.54, p < .001, sr2 = .059. In other words, after partialling out 
variance specifically associated with “climate change is a hoax” conspiracy theories, 
conspiracy suspicions about climate change are consistent with the theory that there is a 
conspiracy to cover up the negative effects of global warming. 
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This result merits further explanation, since past research has shown that some 
contradictory conspiracy theories show positive intercorrelations (Wood et al., 2012). This is 
thought to be due to the fact that although contradictory, those theories are based on a variety 
of shared assumptions. Someone who finds the death of Princess Diana suspicious might 
simultaneously entertain multiple possible theories about what exactly happened to her, and 
any piece of evidence that casts doubt on the official account of her death could potentially be 
spun as evidence for any number of alternative explanations. On the other hand, the rival 
conspiracy theories about climate change share almost no common assumptions beyond the 
existence of some kind of conspiracy. The theory that climate change is a hoax and the theory 
that it is happening but is being deliberately underplayed are incompatible on a very basic 
level; most likely, they reflect competing and incompatible ideologies. Trust in climate 
science, particularly in the United States, shows a substantial partisan divide, and the belief 
that climate change is a hoax is associated with free-market ideology (Lewandowsky, Gignac, 
& Oberauer, 2013). While conspiracy theories about the fossil fuel industry subverting the 
public’s understanding of climate science are not as well studied, they tend to have an anti-
corporate bent that puts them at odds with free-market economic libertarianism. Moreover, 
this kind of conspiracy theory defines itself in opposition to claims that anthropogenic 
climate change is a hoax, itself a conspiracy theory, rather than in common opposition to a 
mainstream narrative (e.g. Dunlap & Jacques, 2013). 
This set of findings highlights a limitation of the FICS. The attempt in Study 3 to 
confine FICS responses to one particular class of climate change conspiracy theory with 
careful phrasing did not prevent suspicions related to the other type from contaminating the 
responses. When a topic is the subject of diametrically opposing conspiracy theories that are 
share almost no common assumptions, the FICS is probably less suited to the task than a 
measure that explicitly separates the different theories from one another. 
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Rasch scaling and short-form scale 
At 17 items, the FICS is quite long as a measure of suspicions about a single topic. It 
would be useful to have a more compact version of the scale to use as a briefer measurement. 
To this end, a Rasch scaling analysis was performed using the Rating Scale Model (RSM) of 
the eRm package for R (Mair & Hatzinger, 2007). Rasch scaling, an extension of Item 
Response Theory, examines the performance of individual scale items in relation to the rest 
of the scale and examines how well each item suits the responses of different participants 
with varying group membership and levels of the construct, but to different participants as 
well (Wright, 1977; for a detailed description of the mathematical underpinnings of Rasch 
scaling as applied to scale development, see McCutcheon, Lange, & Houran, 2002).  
Infit and outfit 
In Rasch-type models, infit and outfit statistics denote the degree to which each item 
matches the overall construct being measured, with the acceptable ranges for each falling 
from 0.6 to 1.4; extreme infit and outfit statistics indicate either redundancy with other items 
or low relevance to the construct (Linacre & Wright, 1994). An initial RSM analysis of the 
17-item FICS-V, FICS-E, and FICS-911 (excluding the FICS-CC due to the issues noted 
above) revealed substantial variance in item performance, as determined by the infit and 
outfit statistics (see Table 2). The seven items with at least one fit score outside of the .6-1.4 
range (items 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 11, and 16) were dropped, leaving a ten-item scale on which the 
analysis was run again. This indicated poor performance by item 12; after removing that item, 
further analysis found no additional violations of the .6-1.4 infit/outfit criterion.  
Differential item functioning by age and gender1 
Rasch modelling confers the ability to test for differential item functioning (DIF) – 
items that elicit different responses across participant subgroups, when accounting for 
differences in the total score. DIF is generally regarded as problematic in a psychometric 
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scale. Using Wald tests, DIF was tested for across genders and ages (median split). As might 
be expected given the variance in subject matter, the results varied across scales. While 
several items showed isolated evidence of DIF, the only items to exhibit consistent DIF were 
6 (age and gender in FICS-911, age in FICS-V, gender in FICS-E) and 15 (age and gender in 
FICS-E, gender in FICS-V). These two items were eliminated from analysis and the 
preceding analyses re-run; the resulting 7-item scale showed no infit/outfit violations, but 
items 5 and 14 displayed evidence of DIF for gender (FICS-911 for both) and age (FICS-V 
for both, and FICS-E for item 14). A further iteration with these items removed showed no 
consistent evidence of age/gender DIF for any item. There was a minor infit/outfit violation 
for item 1 (outfit = .59 on FICS-911), but this is not a major challenge to validity as a low 
outfit statistic essentially means that the item is redundant with others on the scale for a 
subset of participants (Linacre & Wright, 1994). The final short-form version of the FICS 
therefore consists of items 1, 3, 9, 13, and 17, the difficulty parameters of which varied 
somewhat across topics (see Table 3). 
Factor structure 
To test for unidimensionality of the short-form scale, a principal components analysis 
was performed on the residuals of the RSM. All eigenvalues were less than 1.50, close to the 
reference values for similar sample sizes (Brentari & Golia, 2007), providing evidence that 
the scale is indeed unidimensional. 
Reanalysis with short-form scale 
Re-running the correlation and regression analyses with the reduced scale in Studies 2 
and 3 yielded, in every case, the same pattern of results as originally obtained with the 17-
item scale. As expected, the 5-item and 17-item scales also correlated very strongly in each 
case; for FICS-V, r = .992; for FICS-911, r = .990; for FICS-CC, r = .979; for FICS-E, r = 
.981. 
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General Discussion 
These three studies demonstrate the primary strengths and limitations of the FICS. 
Studies 1 and 2 showed that the FICS approximates the validity of existing scales of beliefs in 
conspiracy theories about 9/11 and vaccine safety, while the election result in Study 3 
demonstrated the validity of the FICS as a tool for research into conspiracy theories for which 
no well-validated scale currently exists. However, the climate change version of the FICS in 
Study 3 highlights the superiority of specific scales when there are multiple conspiracy 
theories about the same subject that would make opposing predictions for the subject of 
interest (in this case, pro-environmental behaviour). Finally, Rasch scaling analyses have 
yielded a short-form scale with high performance and minimal DIF by age and gender. 
As noted earlier, one of the challenges involved in constructing list-style conspiracy 
belief scales is that they require a high degree of knowledge about the conspiracy theories 
surrounding the topic. Although constructing a FICS variant does not require such thorough 
knowledge, Study 3 demonstrates that some basic level of knowledge is necessary. At the 
very least, a researcher implementing the FICS should first determine whether there are 
subclasses of conspiracy theory which are contradictory on the level of basic ideological 
assumptions. The FICS will lump these subclasses together, but depending on the research 
question, it might make more sense to separate them. 
This limitation comes from the fact that the FICS does not measure conspiracy beliefs 
per se. As implied by the name, the Flexible Inventory of Conspiracy Suspicions measures 
suspicions. Very often, suspicions of conspiracy are what the researcher is interested in. 
Studies of conspiracy theories on a particular topic frequently use scales in the form of a 
laundry list of specific theories, with a broad goal of measuring how much someone believes 
the conspiracy theories about a particular topic (e.g. Swami et al., 2010; Jolley & Douglas, 
26 
2013). It is this sort of study, more interested in general suspicions about a topic than about 
the specific content of the conspiracy theories it engenders, that the FICS is well-suited for.  
 Other studies are interested in the thoughts and behaviours associated with very 
specific conspiracy theories; in these cases, it may be better to ask about the theories 
themselves rather than about the general suspicions that they reflect. Regardless, when 
general conspiracy thinking about a topic is the variable of interest, the FICS should maintain 
relative consistency across time and space, with a minimum initial investment of time and 
resources by the researcher, rendering it a good candidate for an all-purpose measure of 
conspiracy beliefs about a given topic. Of course, this is not guaranteed; further research is 
needed to determine the cross-cultural validity of the FICS. Moreover, despite the scale’s 
vagueness, certain items may work better in a particular cultural context than in others (e.g. 
those that contain references to the media). 
Study 3 uncovered an interesting ancillary finding that bears mentioning here: 
suspicion that elections are controlled by conspiracies is uncorrelated with political 
participation intentions. This was unexpected, as it stands to reason that believing that the 
system is rigged would discourage participation. A possible answer comes from the fact that 
people with higher beliefs in conspiracy theories tend to demonstrate a higher support for 
democratic principles (Swami et al., 2010, 2011). A higher investment in the principles of 
democracy might help to mitigate any direct negative effects of conspiracy beliefs on civic 
engagement. To clarify this relationship, future research would do well to examine the effects 
of conspiracy worldviews on voting and civic engagement with support for democratic 
principles or perceived political self-efficacy as potential moderators. 
The ability to measure conspiracy suspicion may inform future efforts at devising 
process models for conspiracy belief. For instance, Wood et al. (2012) found that a critical 
component of beliefs in Osama Bin Laden death conspiracy theories was a high-level belief 
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that something was being covered up – in essence, a conspiracy suspicion that encompasses 
several lower-level, potentially contradictory beliefs. This suggests that it may be profitable 
to model conspiracy beliefs as the bottom tier of a three-level conspiracy belief model that 
gains specificity from the top down (see Figure 1). The top level, conspiracist ideation, 
encompasses a general worldview that conspiracies are probable and commonplace. This is 
measured more or less directly by measures of general conspiracy belief like the GCB and 
CMQ (Brotherton et al., 2013; Bruder et al., 2013), and is likely affected directly by broad 
individual-difference variables like schizotypy, delusional ideation, personality, and 
interpersonal trust (e.g. Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999). The second level, conspiracy suspicion 
(as measured by the FICS), is more specific – rather than a general worldview, a conspiracy 
suspicion comprises the belief that something is suspicious about a particular topic, but does 
not include a detailed idea of what that might be. Conspiracy suspicions, in contrast to 
general conspiracist ideation, are likely fed by ideology, negative evaluations of particular 
social groups, perceived ulterior motives, and other variables that are specific to particular 
topics but not so specific that they only support specific theories (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; 
Uscinski & Parent, 2014). Of course, conspiracy suspicions are also more likely in 
individuals with high conspiracist ideation. The final level, specific conspiracy belief as 
measured by instruments like the Swami 9/11 scale (Swami et al., 2010), is determined by 
conspiracy suspicion about a particular topic, evidence that seems to support one particular 
theory about that event over another, and, depending on the specifics of the theory, other 
relevant conspiracy suspicions. For instance, someone with strong conspiracy suspicions 
about both 9/11 and Israel would be likely to believe in specific theories that implicate Israeli 
intelligence in 9/11. Of course, there is likely some feedback as well, such that changes in 
suspicion and belief can prompt changes in one’s worldview over time. This model 
incorporates the various influences on conspiracy belief into a coherent framework with clear 
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predictions. For instance, if this model holds, the influence of personality on belief in a 
particular conspiracy should occur by way of conspiracist ideation and by conspiracy 
suspicions, with little or no direct effect.  
In summary, the FICS has the potential to drastically curtail the amount of work and 
subject-specific knowledge needed to measure suspicions of a conspiracy about a particular 
subject. The studies reviewed above have demonstrated both its utility and its limitations, and 
may facilitate use of this instrument in future research. Ideally, the FICS, along with its 
predecessors the GCB and CMQ, will signal an ongoing trend in the conspiracy psychology 
literature toward a theory-based standardisation of measures and enable future research on 
multi-level models for the formation of specific conspiracy beliefs from broader worldviews 
and suspicions. 
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Endnote 
1DIF analyses often include an examination of the differences in responses between high and 
low scorers. In this case, however, such testing was made impossible by a lack of higher-end 
responses on all items by low-scoring participants and of lower-end responses by high-
scoring participants.  
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Table 1. Matrix of Pearson correlations between the various scales used in Study 2. FICS 
scores are derived from the 17-item version of the scale. All correlations are significant at the 
p < .001 level.  
 
Variable 1 2 3 
1. FICS-911 –   
2. Swami 9/11 scale .897 –  
3. Jolley vaccine scale .572 .641 – 
4. FICS-VS .578 .610 .880 
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Table 2. Initial infit/outfit values for each FICS item across topics. Problematic fit values 
(outside the range 0.6-1.4) are bolded. 
Item 9/11 Vaccines  Elections 
1. The real truth about _____ is being kept from the 
public. 
0.91/0.85 0.63/0.61 0.73/0.70 
2. There is something very suspicious about the 
things the public has been told about ___. 
1.04/0.98 0.65/0.59 0.96/0.99 
3. People need to wake up and start asking questions 
about ___. 
1.08/1.16 1.19/1.16 0.91/0.92 
4. Those in power are going to a great deal of 
trouble to keep ___ from being thoroughly 
investigated. 
0.83/0.78 0.64/0.58 0.71/0.74 
5. If most people knew the real truth about ___, 
there would be riots in the streets. 
1.20/1.21 1.39/1.26 1.25/1.28 
6. It’s very suspicious that so few people in the 
media question whether we’re being told the truth 
about ___. 
1.03/1.06 0.69/0.68 1.11/1.08 
7. When it comes to ___, most people are asleep and 
need to wake up. 
0.97/0.93 1.29/1.55 0.65/0.63 
8. Those in power are very nervous that the public 
will realize the truth about ___. 
1.22/1.25 0.70/0.62 1.40/1.48 
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9. Legitimate questions about ___ are being 
suppressed by the government, the media, and 
academia.  
1.14/1.32 0.79/0.92 0.93/0.87 
10. The facts about ___ simply don’t match what 
we’ve been told by “experts” and the mainstream 
media.  
0.70/0.63 0.59/0.55 0.83/0.81 
11. We need a new, unbiased investigation to 
uncover the real truth about ___. 
1.07/0.97 1.63/1.65 0.91/0.89 
12. Anyone who's been paying attention knows that 
we're being lied to about ___, but most people are 
simply brainwashed.  
0.72/0.63 0.72/0.60 0.77/0.73 
13. Reporters, scientists, and government officials 
are involved in a conspiracy to cover up important 
information about ___.  
0.77/0.80 0.76/0.73 1.32/1.30 
14. We may never know the full truth about ___, but 
it's clear that the mainstream story is a complete lie.  
0.79/0.73 0.72/0.69 1.08/1.13 
15. If the truth about ___ came out, it would hurt the 
interests of some extremely powerful people.  
0.84/0.96 1.40/1.33 0.84/0.81 
16. The mainstream media could never have an 
honest discussion about ___ - there are too many 
powerful interests at work.  
1.02/1.04 1.34/1.48 0.89/0.87 
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17. An impartial, independent investigation of ___ 
would show once and for all that we've been lied to 
on a massive scale. 
0.74/0.71 0.80/0.92 0.73/0.73 
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Table 3. Item difficulty parameters (eta) across topics for each item in the short-form version 
of the FICS. Agreement with each item is rated on a 1-5 Likert scale. 
 
 
Item 9/11 Vaccines Elections 
1. The real truth about ____ is being kept from the 
public.  
-.120 .217 -.251 
3. People need to wake up and start asking questions 
about _____. 
.103 -.920 -1.122 
9. Legitimate questions about _____ are being 
suppressed by the government, the media, and 
academia. 
-.326 .023 .302 
13. Reporters, scientists, and government officials 
are involved in a conspiracy to cover up important 
information about _____. 
.583 .560 1.247 
17. An impartial, independent investigation of ___ 
would show once and for all that we've been lied to 
on a massive scale. 
-.034 .120 -.175 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the three-level model of conspiracy theory belief. General 
conspiracist ideation leads to relatively vague conspiracy suspicions about particular topics, 
which then interact to inform beliefs in specific conspiracy theories. Individual differences, 
evaluations of particular groups and social actors, and exposure to particular theories exert 
varying influences at each level of the model. 
 
 
